While each of us is born into
actual time/space spots, and our identities and prejudices are thus shaped by
the cultural and geographic landscape defining that spot, nonetheless we seem
to be inherently capable of imagining ourselves as being somehow different,
for example as being born into altogether different time/space pockets, or
into “contrary-to-the-fact” situations. Strictly speaking, our imaginative
faculty, inherent as it seems to be to our nature –for we can imagine
ourselves as being somehow different- seems to be at odds with our logical
faculty –for it is not quite clear how our imaginative exercise works-
indeed, whether this exercise is not simply a mere, useless fantasy . An
imaginative exploit of transposing ourselves into a counterfactual situation
in any case seems to challenge the fundamental assumptions underlying our
definition of who we are. Could there be a fundamental “I”, an autonomous or
unencumbered self, an “I” whose identity is at once defined by the here and
now, but which we can also posit as being “there”, in some other locale,
and/or as being “then”, in some other time-slot? On the one hand, we are tied
by our logical faculty to specific contextual identities. We cannot be, as
our actual selves, but who we actually are. On the other hand, also being
ourselves, or who we actually are, we are endowed with an imaginative faculty
which helps us free ourselves from this specific contextual identity, and
which enables us to hypothesize counterfactual contexts, most often in such a
way, for example in some future time, that then enables us to actually become
that person. In an important sense, we are thus made capable of shaping our
identities through being endowed with such a faculty.
Our imaginative faculty is
reinforced by our discourse. We have no trouble identifying Prince Hal with
King Henry Vth., or Joseph the child of a Jewish tribe as Joseph the Pharonic
financial advisor. This Joseph is not simply a cluster of matter traceable in
Humean manner from one place to another. It is also, and more importantly, a
primary hypothesized self, an unencumbered continuous self, which is yet a
cluster of ideas, dreams and destinies, self-made capabilities and roles, meanings,
potentialities, and much , much else. Contextual placement, and the
corresponding actual paths of upbringing and experience, while accounting for
a cluster of identity-components, even for an overwhelming hegemony of such a
cluster in the shaping of our identities, still fails to erase from our minds
the primary existence of an underlying, almost virginal “I”, a potentially
counterfactual “I”, an “I” which could be different, which could be happier,
which could be better, an “I” which, while always perhaps needing to be
placed in a specific context, could freely be posited in an altogether
different context and could will itself to be in that context.
I am not suggesting that such an
underlying I exists in a Cartesian manner, or can exist, independently. But
that it underlies our concept of ourselves, or of others, as a logically
prior notion is, I would suggest, a basic assumption in our discourse, in our
understanding of who we are, or it is, as Strawson might call it, a
“primitive concept”. A counterfactual transposition –using this underlying I
as a hypothetical I- is almost like a magical tool: on the one hand it helps
us understand not only who we happen to be, but also who we could be. By
imagining what we could do, we can strive to improve ourselves through time,
or space. On the other hand, counterfactual transpositions help us understand
others, for the faculty to imagine ourselves as being somehow different, how
we could be, naturally extends to being a faculty for imagining someone else.
It is a faculty, in other words, that reveals to us our sameness with others.
The primary notion of an unencumbered self is at once a primary notion of a
generic self, instantiated indifferently among beings of the same species, or
in particular for the purposes of our discourse, of the human species: it is
instantiated in me as a human being, but also, and in the same sense, in my
political enemy.
Our conversation these couple of
days- relating necessarily as it does to an inter-territorial dimension of
human relations- also and more fundamentally relates to the dichotomy between
a “substitutable I” and an “entrenched I”, an “I” which is definable
ultimately in human terms, and an “I” which is restrictively definable
categorically in specific context-related terms. A substitutable I is one in
whose terms a discourse about human or universal values, about morality, or
human dignity, fits well. An entrenched I, on the other hand, is an I whose
parameters are defined by more strictly-defined religious, cultural, or
national belief-codes; by place and time, by cement walls, by impermeable or
semi-impermeable political or cultural borders. Entrenched identities, and
political and social structures which are founded upon them, may be
contingently necessary, but they are not naturally primary, because within an
entrenched I, however contextually defined, there is a primary substitutable
I, a free I, one which relates to itself and to others primarily as a human
being, rather than as a man or woman, a Hindu or Budhist, a Christian or Jew.
To the extent an entrenched I is given primacy, one is certain to find moral
incongruity, a prejudice, a discrimination, a disenfranchisement, a cultural
or national aloofness, even within the context of so-called democratic
political systems. Such a human end as Kant’s dignity, having as he views it
a worthiness beyond exchangeable value, or being an item which cannot be
exchanged with something else of the same value, for nothing else has such
value, relates to a substitutable I, while my “rights” or privileges as a
specific family member, a resident, a traveler, a citizen, a Jew, a woman,
relate specifically to me as an individual in context, an entrenched I
operating within a maze of other entrenched entities, with whom, or against whom,
my only guarantee of an ultimate right is what is derived from those
entities’ underlying human identity, rather than from what, as entrenched
selves, they prescribe for me as an ordered network of normative rules.
Entrenched Is primarily relate to each other asother; Substitutable Is relate to each other
as belonging to the same club.
The notion of a substitutable I is
useful in the determination of what my rights are as a human being, rather
than as an individual-in-context. Rawl’s veil of ignorance, it may be said,
exemplifies this substitutability. For he asks us to imagine what, from
behind a veil of ignorance of who we are or might be, we believe to be are
primary conditions or rights we believe we ought to possess as human beings.
Abstracting thus from our own individual contexts, we can all come to agree
on what we believe are items of primary value to us as human beings, rather
than as specific individuals-in-context. In this way, we come to relate to a
specific injustice, to a moral outrage, not only and primarily as this
happens to afflict us in our own contingent contexts, as being black or as
belonging to a disenfranchised minority or whatever, but as this comes to
violate our moral sense as human beings. It is on the basis of this fundamental
moral sense, and on these primary moral values, that we can come to construct
or judge political or religious superstructures, whether these are religions
or states or systems of belief, for these can only be defined or evaluated
against this primary set of values, and their source of legitimacy comes to
be viewed as being nothing other than the degree to which they succeed in
addressing these values.
We can view these primary moral
values as human ends, or as a basis for legitimating structures, or authority.
Using them as basic building-blocks we could construct our moral system, and
our corresponding political structure. There may be different approaches as
to what we may consider as basic building-blocks. My own approach, not
dissimilar to that of many others who have thought about this, is to view
those moral ends as being the two of freedom and equality, defined
specifically in the following way: freedom as potential space and as
enablement, or capability, generally along the lines articulated by Amartya
Sen (to enable human beings, viewed as identities that are constantly in the
process of becoming, to develop towards what is best, or to better
themselves, thus providing them with the conditions –economic, political,
legal, educational, environmental, etc.- in which such development can take
place); and equality as being the distribution of that right (or requirement
or basic concern) among all. These two values can be regarded as the core
values in one’s moral system. They can be regarded as rights. But they can
equally importantly be viewed as basic human concerns over which human beings
can reach consensus from behind a veil of ignorance. We need not regard them
as the highest values on a moral ladder. Other values, such as justice or
dignity, can hold a higher esteem in our system. But they are core values to
the extent that the building-blocks of the system cannot but be founded upon
them. While they are not, strictly speaking, Rawl’s primary liberties, I
would suggest they form a true consensus of individuals negotiating from
behind his veil of ignorance to reach agreement on a set of indivisible basic
or primary concerns.
But whether we assume these, or
another defensible set of moral values as primary human concerns, rights or
requirements in our system, we can then naturally proceed to evaluate States
as political superstructures, whether through their identifying features of
space (their territorial extensions) or their identifying features of content
(their general governance structures). Whatever is said to appertain to such
constructs as rights vis-à-vis other entities, or as a legitimate authority
over the state’s own citizens, comes clearly to be seen as being derivative
from those primary values rather than being primary themselves, in being
founded upon the degree to which such constructs in fact address the basic
values appertaining to the individual human being. Indeed, any construct,
whether communal, national, or religious, in justifying itself, must seek to
derive its legitimacy and define its space of rights and responsibilities in
terms of its ability to address the individual as a primary unit of
discourse. We need not see this unit of discourse as a Lockean or even a
Hobbesian self-centered, egotistic self. Indeed, we can posit a compassionate
self as such a unit of discourse, as Ibn Khaldun arguably does, or as a
communitarian might. However it is viewed, this self remains the source of
values, and therefore of legitimacy of the political structure wherein it
exists.
Let me now relate what I’ve said so
far to the Palestinian territorial imperative: Mathematically speaking, we
here seem to have several political options for bringing about our moral
human ends as Palestinians, an independent Palestinian State, morally
constituted, only being one of them. But it is not, in my view, and as I have
been at pains to show, a construct that has worthiness in itself. Its
worthiness, morally speaking, derives from its function as a mechanism by
means of which the moral ends of the Palestinian as a human being are met. If
a Palestinian state indeed proves to be the necessary and sufficient medium
for the attainment of those ends, then the State comes to assume a derivative
worthiness, or a worthiness insofar as it is capable of addressing those ends.
But a State, while necessary, may not be sufficient. For example, it may turn
out to be also necessary, with those ends in mind, to construct complimentary
structures, whether economic or political, and whether generically identical
or different, with other states, wherever they may be, simply as a means of
expanding the capability space of individuals, or the economic, political or
cultural space which would best facilitate their development towards what is
best. Regional structures in this sense, if constructed with a view to
expanding freedom as capability, can come to naturally reflect basic moral
values. Conversely, it may be argued that a State is not a necessary medium
for the fulfillment of such ends, or indeed, that it is not in the circumstances
even possible, whether in the first place, or in the negotiated form
emanating from the existing balance of power. Under such conditions, the
pursuit of such ends may be posited as being possible by default if not by
some grander cause only via a totally different approach, for example through
Israel’s extension of political rights to all Palestinians under its virtual
and actual rule, such that, in the final analysis, Palestinians come to be
enabled as equals under the Israeli system to develop themselves. However
viewed, the continued disenfranchisement of Palestinians, whether as
individuals or as a national group, is not morally sustainable; nor is, by
the same token, the authority, by whatever name or justification, that
happens to be the instrument of this disenfranchisement
In all events, the territorial,
even national imperative, I would suggest, is a means and not an end. As a
final note, I should perhaps point out what I believe to be an inherent
feature in the transposition from first-order units of discourse, or
individuals, to so-called second-order units of discourse, such as nations:
on the one hand, the transposition’s worthiness, it will be apparent, can
only be derivative on this view in the sense that the nation’s worthiness
will depend upon the degree to which the moral ends of human beings can be
better met in a national context. On the other hand, the transposition also
presupposes a trade-off, namely the rights of specific individuals or groups
for the generalgood or national interest, insofar and only insofar as this
good is defined in terms of the procurement of our basic rights as we have
already defined them to any and all unspecified individuals or groups who are
members of that nation. One conclusion to be derived from this observation is
that a common territorial claim here comes to be viewed as being more worthy,
or is of a higher moral order, than an individual territorial claim. It is in
this sense, I believe, that Palestinians can be morally assured of a
compromise they envision with Israel,
but have conversely to be informed as to the territorial limitations upon
themselves of such a compromise.
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